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Stochastic interdependence, possibility and probabilistic causality1. Preamble: interactions with Lotfi Zadeh
I first met Lotfi Zadeh when I started work at GWU around
1970. He was an advisor to GWU’s School of Engineering
and Applied Science, and was a revered and well liked
figure. Lotfi gave us a seminar wherein he challenged the
Kolmogorov Axioms of Probability. Since I was hired at GWU
to teach probability and statistics to engineering students, I felt
compelled to react to the challenge. Lotfi gracefully listened
to me, and in his characteristic calm demeanor defended his
viewpoints using arguments that fell on deaf ears. These ears
remained deaf until about 1998 when (the late) Tom Bement,
Jane Booker and Sallie Keller, who were then at Los Alamos,
asked me to look at ‘‘fuzzy sets’’, ‘‘membership functions’’ and
the ‘‘possibility theory’’, on the grounds that they were being
forcefully touted by the engineering community.
Subsequent to the GWU seminar, I saw Lotfi several times
at different venues, and he always inquired how up to date my
Farsi was. I kept reminding Lotfi that I was not an Iranian, but
that my ancestors, about 1300 years ago, did hail from Iran.
It seems that Lotfi never holds a grudge against anyone, even
those who challenge him publicly.
Lotfi’s initial papers on fuzzy sets deepenedmy appreciation
of Kolmogorov’s sample space based architecture of the
probability theory, and opened my eyes to the ‘‘law of the
excluded middle’’ which underlies the theory. By the same
token, his notion of a membership function convinced me of
the power and flexibility of the likelihood function. All this
enabled me, with Jane Booker, to develop an encompassing
approach to probability assessment [1], and in so doing, we
were able to make the case that possibility, as an alternative
to probability, may not be unnecessary. But Lotfi’s work
also had (for me) an important by-product. It motivated
me to study Art Dempster’s work on ‘‘belief functions’’,
because Art, like Lotfi, was looking at another limitation of
the Kolmogorov measure theoretic architecture. Specifically,
Kolmogorov induces probability measures of random variables
by requiring that the latter be a many-to-one-map. There
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Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.are many scenarios which call for a one-to-many-map, and
to account for these, belief functions are introduced. Alyson
Wilson, with whom I ended up writing a joint paper [2], played
a key role in me coming to grips with Art’s work. Lotfi’s work
has had an impact on my professional life, not only vis à vis the
two publications cited above, but more so because the paper
with Booker has often been referenced in philosophy literature.
I will now go on to the topic of this paper, namely causality and
interdependence.
2. On causality and interdependence: background
Lotfi’s attitude to engineering has been philosophical, and
this sets him aside from many of his engineering colleagues
whosemain concerns appear to be focused on seeking solutions
to problems. So the question I pose here is: ‘‘How can one
satisfactorily articulate interdependence and causality using
the calculus of possibility?’’ I do not have an answer to this
question. My hope is that there is someone out there that can
produce an answer and, if not, at least generate a discussion.
With that in mind, I give below an appreciation of causality and
independence, using the calculus of personal probability.
From a philosophical perspective, it is the notion of causality
that gave birth to the notion of dependence, even though
the two turn out to be different. Remember, the famous
quote: ‘‘correlation is not causation.’’ The empire of causality
can be conceptualized as a network of giants, with Aristotle
as the source node, and a yet to be discovered sink node.
The intervening nodes are Bacon (an empiricist), Descartes
(axiomatizer), Newton (the suspicious genius), Berkeley (the
non-Bayesian) and Hume (the skeptic), as a junction node
that has spawned the likes of Kant (an apriorist), Mill (the
logician), Popper (the refuter) and Khun (the revolutionist).
Against this background of giants appear two modern day
giants: de Finetti and Suppes upon whose ideas I lean. Their
disposition to interdependence and causality is probabilistic,
and to appreciate this, we need to come to terms with the
personalistic view of probability. The personalistic view of
probability translates to a personalistic view of causality as
well [3].
The personalistic view of probability was espoused by
the likes of Bayes, Laplace, Poisson, Borel, Keynes, de Finetti,
Ramsey and Savage, and has beenmost convincingly articulated
by Lindley. In doing so, the above part company with Venn,
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and Schrodinger.
3. Deterministic causality: difficulties with
Since the notion of dependence sprouts from the notion
of causality, it behoves one to say a few words about the
difficulties associated with causality, as evidenced by the
following quotes of Newton, Hume and Kant, respectively:
• ‘‘The cause of gravity I do not pretend to know’’.
• ‘‘The ultimate cause of the phenomena we observe are
beyond the reach of human inquiry. We have no means
of knowing that future instances will conform to our past
experience. Our predictions may have turned out right
before, but that is no conclusive argument that they will
continue to do so. Our belief in some necessary link or
connection between causes and effects derives mainly
from our subjective expectations. Our belief in real causal
connections in nature is founded on subjective habit or
expectation, not reason’’.
• ‘‘The concept of causality is somethingwe possess a priori, in
advance of particular observations, and which has a certain
kind of objective validity’’.
4. Personal probability: in the style of de Finetti
Let D denote an assessor of personal probability, and
consider two unknown events, say A and B. Then PτD(A;H) is
D ’s personal probability of event A, assessed at time τ , when
the background information about A that is possessed by D at
time τ isH . In what follows, we suppressD , τ andH , so that
PτD(A;H) is simply P(A). de Finetti makes P(A), operational by
interpreting it as a 2-sided bet against an individualE . That is,D
stakes an amount, P(A), in exchange of one, should A occur, and
is prepared to lose P(A) should A not occur.D is also prepared
to stake (1 − P(A)) against event A. That is, D receives one, if
A does not occur, and loses (1− P(A)) if A does occur. E gets to
choose the side of the bet [4], similarly, with event B.
The conditional probability of event A, ‘‘given’’ event B, is
denoted P(A|B). It is the amount that D is willing to stake
for event A, supposing that B were to occur. If B were not to
occur, the bet is called off. Conditional probabilities are in the
subjunctive mood.
In Kolmogorov’s axiomatization of probability, there are
two rules: Convexity; i.e. 0 ≤ P(A) ≤ 1, and additivity;
i.e. P(A or B) = P(A) + P(B) if A and B are mutually exclusive.
The multiplication rule, namely, P(A and B) = P(A|B) · P(B) =
P(B|A) · P(A), is taken as a definition.
5. Stochastic dependence and its interpretation
First, stochastic dependence is not logical dependence,
wherein proposition A can be expressed in terms of proposition
B, via de Morgan’s set operations like unions, intersections,
complements, etc., which make A dependent on B. By contrast,
stochastic dependence has an easy to appreciate probabilistic
connotation. We say that A and B are stochastically independent
if P(A|B) = P(A) and P(A|Bc) = P(A), where Bc is the
complement of B, mutatis-mutandis for P(B|A) as well. Thus A,
stochastically independent of B, implies that B is stochastically
independent of A, and vice-versa.
Stochastic independence can be interpreted in a personal-
istic framework by noting that knowledge of B (or A) does notalter ones betting disposition towardsA (orB). De facto, stochas-
tic independence connotes an absence of learning and, like
probability, is also personal. The above definition of indepen-
dence generalizes to multiple events, and it also enables the in-
troduction of conditional independence used in belief nets (not
to be confused with belief functions).
Stochastic interdependence is the absence of stochastic inde-
pendence. Thus the judgment of stochastic interdependence is
not absolute; it is personal. What is independent to Lotfi may
be interdependent to Jane, and vice-versa.
6. Probabilistic causality: Suppes
Unlike interdependence, wherein there is no consideration
of time of occurrence of events, and wherein the events
commute (i.e. A independent of B implies that B is independent
of A), probabilistic causality entails a time order and the events
in question do not commute. That is, if event A is the cause of
event B, then event B cannot be the cause of event A.
Event A, according to [5], is the prima facie cause of event B,
if:
(i) A occurs before B in time;
(ii) P(A) > 0;
(iii) P(B|A) > P(B) and P(B|Ac) < P(B).
Thus a cause is a probability raising event, whereas
interdependence is a probability changing event. A is called a
prima facie cause, when A could only be an apparent cause, not
a true cause. For articulating true causes, we need the notion of
a genuine cause. A genuine cause is a prima facie cause that is
not a spurious cause, where A is a spurious cause of B, if and only
if there exists a cause S, where:
(i) S occurs before A;
(ii) P(A and S) > 0;
(iii) P(B|A, S) = P(B|S);
(iv) P(B|A, S) ≥ P(B|A).
Thus a spurious cause is a prima facie cause that can be
explained away by conditioning on an earlier event (or a
common cause of A and B) that accounts as well for the con-
ditional probability of the effect. Probabilistic causality of-
fers a convenient vehicle to articulate the notion of cascading
events [4].
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